Proofs, not data.
To hold AI agents accountable, the obvious design is to watch everything they do. The obvious design is wrong — an oversight layer that sees everything becomes the honeypot it was meant to guard against. Mandare is built the other way around.
Every activity-recording system faces the same question sooner or later: who watches the record? If your agents' complete history — every API call, every payment, every approval — sits on a vendor's servers, that vendor is now the most valuable target in your stack. It can be breached. It can be subpoenaed. It can quietly become a data business. Enterprises know this, which is why "send us your full agent telemetry" is a hard sell to exactly the buyers who need accountability most.
The record stays home
Mandare is local-first: the ledger — the append-only, hash-chained record of everything your agents did — lives on your machine. We never see its contents. What leaves your machine is a content-free cryptographic fingerprint, sent to a witness you choose — a second machine of your own or a third party: a hash that commits to the record's state without revealing a single byte of what's in it.
77014fc7fd8b70f0c785abb2e37179225f7de8b22f99187495770cad6a881a66 a fingerprint — enough to check integrity, nothing to read, leak, or subpoena
That fingerprint is not decoration. Because each entry is hash-linked to the previous one and signed by the infrastructure that wrote it — the door the agent passed through, never the agent itself — any later edit to an entry breaks the chain visibly, and mandare verify names the entry. Dropping the newest entries is subtler: the shorter file still verifies on its own. That's what the witness is for. Run on infrastructure you don't control, with the verifier holding the door key out-of-band, it makes truncation and rollback detectable too. The record's integrity becomes publicly checkable while its contents stay private.
What this buys you
Nothing to leak. We can't lose, sell, or be forced to hand over what we never hold. Your agents' activity is not our asset; its integrity is.
Nothing custodial. Mandare never holds the money either — no float, no banking license, no counterparty risk hiding in the fine print. Limits are enforced at the doors; funds never touch us.
Evidence that convinces skeptics. An auditor or a finance team doesn't have to trust your agent's self-report — agents demonstrably misreport their own actions — or trust us. They verify the chain themselves. Verification is free, for anyone, forever; the verifier is open source (Apache-2.0). You can see exactly what that verification looks like in a runaway loop dying at €20, where the refusal itself becomes a checkable ledger entry.
No invented standards
The cryptography here is deliberately boring: HTTP Message Signatures (RFC 9421) for signed requests, a JWK Set key directory for publishing door keys (modelled on the Web Bot Auth directory drafts; we make no claim that a Web Bot Auth verifier accepts a Mandare signature or directory), SD-JWT VC for credentials, did:key for identifiers. Mandare's job is to compose the standards the web is already adopting — and to fit into that world rather than fight it.
In an industry nervous about AI oversight, an oversight layer that cannot surveil you is rare. That's not a compromise we accepted. It's the design. The full picture — identity, mandates, and this ledger — lives on the Mandare homepage.
Questions
Does Mandare see what my AI agents do?
No. Mandare is local-first: the ledger, the append-only, hash-chained record of everything your agents did, lives on your machine, and Mandare Labs never sees its contents. What leaves your machine is a content-free cryptographic fingerprint, sent to a witness you choose.
What can the witness learn from the fingerprint?
Nothing about what your agents did. The fingerprint is a hash that commits to the record's state without revealing a single byte of what is in it: enough to check integrity, nothing to read, leak, or subpoena. The witness is one you choose, a second machine of your own or a third party.
How can someone check the ledger without trusting the agent or Mandare?
Each entry is hash-linked to the previous one and signed by the door the agent passed through, so a later edit breaks the chain and mandare verify names the entry. Dropping the newest entries is subtler, because the shorter file still verifies on its own: a witness on infrastructure you don't control, with the verifier holding the door key out-of-band, makes truncation and rollback detectable too. The verifier is open source (Apache-2.0).
Sources
- RFC 9421: HTTP Message Signatures · IETF / RFC Editor · 2024-02
- RFC 7517: JSON Web Key (JWK) · IETF / RFC Editor · 2015-05
- HTTP Message Signatures for Automated Traffic (draft-ietf-webbotauth-httpsig-protocol-00) · IETF Web Bot Auth Working Group · 2026-09-01
- SD-JWT-based Verifiable Digital Credentials (SD-JWT VC), draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-19 · IETF OAuth Working Group · 2026-08-31
- The did:key Method v0.9 · W3C Credentials Community Group
Run it yourself: 3 commands, no API keys.
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